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Recent embodied approaches in cognitive sciences emphasize the constitutive roles of 
bodies and environment in driving cognitive processes. Cognition is thus seen as a dis-
tributed system based on the continuous interaction of bodies, brains, and environment. 
These categories, moreover, do not relate only causally, through a sequential input–out-
put network of computations; rather, they are dynamically enfolded in each other, being 
mutually implemented by the concrete patterns of actions adopted by the cognitive 
system. However, while this claim has been widely discussed across various disciplines, 
its relevance and potential beneficial applications for music therapy remain largely unex-
plored. With this in mind, we provide here an overview of the embodied approaches to 
cognition, discussing their main tenets through the lenses of music therapy. In doing so, 
we question established methodological and theoretical paradigms and identify possible 
novel strategies for intervention. In particular, we refer to the music-based rehabilita-
tive protocols adopted for Parkinson’s disease patients. Indeed, in this context, it has 
recently been observed that music therapy not only affects movement-related skills but 
that it also contributes to stabilizing physiological functions and improving socio-affective 
behaviors. We argue that these phenomena involve previously unconsidered aspects of 
cognition and (motor) behavior, which are rooted in the action-perception cycle charac-
terizing the whole living system.
Keywords: embodiment, music therapy, parkinsonism, dynamic systems, brain plasticity, motor rehabilitation, 
well-being
introdUCtion
Over the last three millennia, across different times, places, and cultures, music making, and music 
listening have been often associated with medicine (1), meditation (2), and well-being (3), serving 
a variety of functions deeply intermingled with everyday-life and social activities (4–9). In Ancient 
Greece, for example, human musical behaviors were not considered as contemplative or abstract 
practices, but were rather actively employed for education, religious ceremonies, celebrations, and, 
indeed, medical treatments (10, 11). More systematic therapeutic interventions involving music 
emerged after the Second World War – for example to help ex-soldiers or injured civilians recovering 
from stress and other related conditions (12, 13). Rehabilitative protocols adopted in this period 
were mostly based on models provided by the social sciences of the day – where the “cultural role 
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of music was interpreted as an effective facilitator for therapeutic 
concepts of ‘wellbeing’” [(14), p. 174]. As such, the focus was on 
exploring how the employment of music could alleviate pain, 
promote emotional expression and sociality, motivate patients, 
and enhance self-esteem (15, 16).
From the early 2000s, with the unprecedented development of 
brain sciences and neuroimaging techniques, the study of music 
therapy shifted to a new, highly stimulating, research focus. 
Mirroring the same reorientation witnessed in other disciplines 
devoted to the study of mind,1 agency, and behavior, many schol-
ars started to explore in greater details the neurological aspects 
related to musical activities in clinical and non-clinical contexts 
[see Altenmüller and Schlaug (17–19), Janata and Grafton (20), 
and Thaut (21)]. Within this area, a wealth of empirical evidence 
has showed the high degree of functional and structural plastic-
ity of the human brain when involved in the complex demands 
associated with musical activity (22–26). For example, it has been 
demonstrated that intense Melodic Intonation Therapy (27, 28) 
may elicit –  in patients suffering from non-fluent aphasia after 
left frontal lobe damage – the reactivation of inhibited language-
competent brain regions in the right frontal brain networks 
(29–34). Additionally, other findings have confirmed the benefits 
of music-supported therapy in motor rehabilitation: first, studies 
with stroke patients revealed significant behavioral improve-
ments in a variety of tasks related to fine motor skills (35, 36), 
accompanied by impressive reorganization of cortical sensorimo-
tor networks (37, 38); second, research with Parkinson’s patients 
has shown that entrainment with a rhythmically rich auditory 
feedback may alleviate Parkinsonian gait by “increasing the excit-
ability of spinal motor neurons via the reticulospinal pathway, 
thereby reducing the amount of time required for the muscles to 
respond to a given motor command” [McIntosh et al. (39), p. 25; 
see also Arias and Cudeiro (40)]. Increasingly, the clinical adop-
tion of music-based paradigms seems to offer not only a valid 
non-pharmacological tool for intervention in diverse contexts 
[including for example pain treatment, see Bernatzky et al. (41)] 
but also innovative insights into the anatomy and physiology of 
the brain [e.g., Särkämö et al. (42)]. In general, a rich variety of 
empirical findings have demonstrated how musical experiences 
may improve the lives of patients suffering from various neuro-
logical diseases [e.g., Forsblom et al. (43) and O’Kelly et al. (44)], 
integrating neuroscientific and musical research in novel and 
fascinating ways (45, 46).
To this already fertile ground, we would like to add insights 
from the recent embodied trend, which has recently emerged in 
cognitive science and in philosophy of mind [e.g., Lakoff and 
Johnson (47), Shapiro (48), Stewart et al. (49), and Varela et al. 
(50)]. This framework has contributed a new and important 
perspective on the sciences of mind and (inter)subjectivity, with 
its central thesis2 being that cognition “depends on the kinds 
of experiences that come from having a body with particular 
perceptual and motor capacities that are inseparably linked and 
1 ‘Mind’ and ‘cognition’ are used as synonyms in this paper.
2 As we will see, this main claim inspired the development of different research 
programs.
that together form the matrix within which memory, emotion, 
language, and all other aspects of life are meshed” [Thelen et al. 
(51), p. XX].
We argue that framing music-supported therapy within a 
paradigm inspired by this claim may offer useful new ways of 
interpreting results obtained in clinical settings, and in turn poten-
tially improve specific protocols for interventions. Rehabilitative 
strategies for Parkinson’s patients, in particular, may necessitate 
a more unitary, holistic, view to fully appreciate the potential of 
music and its relevance beyond movement recovery only. This 
perspective aligns with recent non-reductionist trends in critical 
neuroscience (52–56), which emphasize the deep continuity of 
mind, behavior, body, brain, environment, affectivity, perception, 
and action; it thus contrasts with more traditional approaches 
where such elements are usually studied as discreet (and causally 
related) categories [see Colombetti (57), Kiverstein and Miller 
(58), and Thompson (59)].
In what follows, therefore, we discuss the need to implement 
insights from embodied cognitive science in research on the brain’s 
anatomical adaptation and for music-based motor rehabilitation. 
First, we introduce the embodied approach by analyzing its main 
tenets and its role in neuroscientific and musical contexts. Here, 
a brief overview of the ‘4Es’ perspective – which, as represented 
in Figure 1, defines cognition as Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, 
and Extended  –  is offered. Subsequently, we shift our focus to 
Parkinsonism, asking whether (and how) established rehabilita-
tive protocols may benefit from the adoption of such compelling 
perspective. Finally, we explore possible clinical applications that 
the ‘4Es’ approach may inspire, showing how these may bring 
forth a richer understanding of the complex network of dynami-
cal interactions between music, environment, body, brain, move-
ment, and well-being.
Varieties oF eMBodiMents
The traditional ‘cognitivist’ approaches that dominated cognitive 
sciences for more than 50 years developed a productive research 
agenda that focuses principally on the role of mental representa-
tions, computations, and specialized cognitive architectures (60–
62). However, analyzing how external information is acquired, 
processed, and represented3 ‘in the head’ scholars within this 
framework are often accused to not adequately take into consid-
eration the body and the ecological niche in which the cognitive 
system is embedded (50, 63–65). Classic cognitivism, it is argued, 
downplays the active and adaptive engagements that unite living 
bodies and niche for the constitution of lived experience; and 
thus, in human terms, it ignores the most fundamental aspects 
of our being-in-the-world (66–68). Accordingly, the cognitivist 
framework may be seen to support a strong dichotomy between 
the inner domain of mind –  functionally realized ‘in the head’ 
thanks to relevant domain-specific cognitive modules – and the 
outer realm of the (social and physical) ‘objective’ world, includ-
ing the system’s own body (59, 69).
3 Representational structures are usually defined by computational procedures that 
operate in light of (are realised by) functionally autonomous cortical regions.
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In contrast to this ‘orthodox’ (70) perspective, various theories 
of embodied cognition have recently emerged as new frameworks 
for the study of human mind. Such approaches are supported 
by a growing cross-disciplinary research agenda that integrates 
relevant contributions in theoretical biology (71), dynamic 
systems theory (72), linguistics (73), neurophysiology (74), 
phenomenological philosophy (75), cognitive science (59), and 
artificial intelligence (76). In general, these embodied frameworks 
emphasize the formative roles of bodies and environments in 
driving cognitive processes (59, 77–79), as well as the primacy of 
action over more ‘intellectual’ faculties to make sense of the world 
(50, 80, 81). As a consequence, cognition is now often described 
in terms of dynamic sensorimotor interactions between the entire 
body of a living system and its environment (49, 82).
While such core insights are widely endorsed by advocates 
of the embodied approach, its richly interdisciplinary agenda 
has resulted in a number of interesting formulations and 
interpretations (83). This growing variety of approaches to 
‘embodied cognition’ has stimulated the discussion across diverse 
fields  –  promoting a highly fruitful exchange of knowledge, 
methodologies, and insights, while nevertheless preventing 
the development of a ‘standard’ framework. In talking about 
the embodied approach, therefore, we actually refer to different 
research programs: Embodiment, Embedment, Enactivism, and 
Externalism (usually labeled as ‘4Es’), which all aim to capture 
how bodies, brains, and environment successfully interact in 
real-time worldly conditions (84). These approaches hold that to 
understand mind we should consider how a living system acts 
in a social and physical environment (85) rather than focusing 
on what goes on ‘within the skull’ only. In order to get a very 
basic idea of the ‘4Es’ perspective, we introduce the following key 
points:
•	 Cognition does not depend solely on brain processes, but 
results from structures widely distributed across the whole 
body of a living system (the mind is embodied).
•	 Cognition arises from interactions with the (social and 
physical) environment; it is actively immersed in the world 
(the mind is embedded).
•	 Cognition can reach beyond the boundaries of skull and skin, 
integrating resources internal and external to the animal (the 
mind is extended).
•	 Cognition consists of embedded and embodied forms of 
interactions between a self-organized living system and its 
environment. Through this dynamic interplay, the creature 
enacts (or brings forth), its own domain of meaning (the 
mind is enacted).
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss each of the 
‘4Es’ approaches in detail; thus we will draw from them selec-
tively  –  adopting both overlapping principles and distinctive 
insights (in particular from the enactive view) when necessary. 
While the debate over these perspectives is still heated in phi-
losophy of mind and cognitive science, the embodied paradigm 
(in its four ‘E’ instantiations) has received little discussion in the 
context of music-based rehabilitative paradigms. But before we 
focus on how specific therapeutic settings may integrate exist-
ing methodological and theoretical models with insights from 
the embodied perspectives (mainly with regard to Parkinson’s 
treatment), it will be necessary to consider three basic principles 
associated with embodied cognition and analyze their role in 
neuroscience (86–88) and music cognition (89–94).
traCKinG doWn eMBodiMent
Although the ‘4Es’ define different research agendas, they all 
maintain that “cognition is embodied” as their starting assump-
tion4 [see Hanna and Maiese (96) and Ward and Stapleton (97)]. 
But what does it really mean? Broadly speaking, it is important to 
understand embodiment not as a given category that may facilitate 
certain aspects of perceptual and cognitive activity, or as a label to 
attach whenever bodily aspects are somehow involved in certain 
cognitive tasks. Rather, ‘embodiment’ should be intended as the 
pre-requisite of an agent’s being-in-the-world (98, 99). Listening 
to music, thinking of a good life event, feeling sad, sharing a 
drink with a friend, and every other possible activity we may have 
experience of, are all conceivable only through our living and lived 
body (67, 100, 101). As Di Paolo and colleagues argue: “to say that 
cognition is embodied is to express a tautology – it simply cannot 
but be embodied” [Di Paolo et al. (102), p. 42]. This passage is 
best understood when considering what Varela et al. (50) define 
as the “three dimensions of embodiment”: bodily self-regulation, 
sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective interaction. Analyzed 
by several contributors [e.g., Thompson (59)], these insights offer 
a thorough perspective on the embodied view, emphasizing the 
explanatory power of moving beyond cognitivism across differ-
ent levels of analysis. Importantly, as we will see, these “three 
dimensions” are extremely relevant for our discussion on music-
based therapy for Parkinson’s disease (PD) patients, which we 
offer below.
Bodily self-regulation
Bodily self-regulation concerns the way an agent’s biological 
structure contributes in regulating, modifying, and controlling 
its homeodynamic requirements. These processes of metabolic 
autonomy ensure that the agent is alive and that it maintains a 
stable interaction with the world. Importantly, as reported by 
Colombetti (103), there is no ‘self ’ in self-organizing organisms: 
no ‘message’ is exchanged in hierarchical fashion between different 
independent levels via top-down or bottom-up pathways (104). 
Instead, the chemical, thermodynamic, and metabolic activity of 
the system’s sub-networks participates as a whole in maintain-
ing the system’s homeostatic adaptivity. The process leading to 
adaptive stability, in which the living system (i.e., a unicellular 
organism, a mammalian, etc.) strives to maintain its autonomous 
identity, is realized through self-producing all that is needed for 
its maintenance (105, 106). The process, in other words, is not 
led by a ‘ghost in the machine,’ but rather by homeostasis (103). 
4 Although there is certainly a continuity among these perspectives, it should be 
noted that some of the arguments used by proponents of the extended mind thesis 
stand in open contrast with an enactive characterisation of cognition, and might 
eventually collapse into a functionalist-like framework, where computations and 
representation would still play a key role in driving cognitive processes, even if 
coupled with external resources [see Thompson and Stapleton (95)].
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Consider the role of emotions, for example: seen as self-regulative 
processes (107, 108), they emerge within the dynamical interac-
tion of a number of neural and extra-neural components, and 
not simply via an input–output sequential chain of events (57). 
Indeed, although defining an operationally closed network,5 the 
self-regulating processes aimed at keeping the agent’s conserva-
tion as auto-sufficient, do establish a meaningful dialectic with 
the environment: “whence the intriguing paradoxicality proper 
to an autonomous identity: the living system must distinguish 
itself from its environment, while at the same time maintaining 
its coupling; this linkage cannot be detached since it is against 
this very environment from which the organism arises, comes 
forth” [Varela (109), p. 85]. By this view, all living systems are 
“self-organizing thermodynamic systems with emergent truly 
global or inherently dominating intrinsic structure, and not mere 
mechanisms like a can-opener or a digital computer” [Hanna 
and Maiese (96), p. 20]. The integrity of self-regulative processes 
always involves world, body, and brain at multiple levels and time-
scales (110). With regard to human musicality, these insights have 
been recently explored by research on bodily self-regulation in 
joint improvisation (111) and by the development of an enactive 
theory of musical emotions (Schiavio et al., under review).
sensorimotor Coupling
The second dimension of embodiment is sensorimotor coupling, 
which may refer to (i) the integration of sensorial and motor 
information occurring in the human brain (112), and (ii) the 
embodied forms of mutual determination established by organ-
ism and environment (113). While (i) and (ii) should always be 
considered as mutually dependent [(114), and see discussion in 
the Section “Intersubjective Interaction”], for reasons of simplifi-
cation we now briefly treat them separately.
Perceptual processes, traditionally, are identified with a 
unidirectional stream of data from the world ‘out there’ that 
is retrieved, codified, and represented ‘in the head,’ eventually 
leading to a behavioral output (movement) (115). This process 
is putatively made possible by an exchange of information 
proceeding from the associative cortex to the agranular frontal 
cortex – where information is integrated with more sophisticated 
(i.e., decision making) aspects of intelligence. Modern neurosci-
ence, however, is well aware of the limitations of this traditional 
model. Consider, for example, the highly complex cytoarchitec-
tonic organization of the frontal lobe’s motor cortex: as Gallese 
(115) notes, a number of anatomical and neurophysiological 
findings have revealed a rich variety of anatomo-functional areas, 
each endowed with specific functional properties and related to 
each other forming distinct cortico-cortical circuits (116). This 
means that each of these parieto-premotor circuits continuously 
participates in integrating sensorial and motor information, 
contributing in redefining the role of the motor cortex –  from 
a mere ‘muscle controller’ to a much more complicated system 
(74). Here, within the inferior frontal gyrus, the lower part of the 
precentral gyrus and the temporal, occipital, and parietal visual 
5 Indeed, the internal self-regulative processes are theoretically sufficient to main-
tain the agent’s homeostatic stability.
areas (117) the existence of a so-called ‘mirror’ system (116, 118, 
119) has been posited to indicate a set of bimodal and trimodal 
neurons, which are elicited not only when doing a given action 
but also when observing (and/or hearing, in the case of trimodal 
neurons) another individual performing the same action6 (120, 
121). Thus, it is argued that in the brain, perception and action 
are not separated entities somehow encapsulated in autonomous 
and independent modules. Rather, they are always mutually 
integrated through a complex web of sensorimotor connectivity, 
involving anticipatory mechanisms that enable the system to 
respond adequately to the demands of the environment (122, 
123).
In league with this discussion, a number of empirical findings 
report the activation of neural circuits involved in motor activity 
and the planning of motor sequences during listening tasks (22, 
124). In a well-known PET study, Halpern and Zatorre (125) 
demonstrated that when musicians listen to or imagine music, 
blood-flow significantly increases in the right supplementary 
motor area (SMA), a region which is implicated in motor control 
[see also Kristeva et al. (126)]. As Rodger et al. (127) comments, 
the involvement of SMA and other brain areas – i.e., basal ganglia, 
and cerebellum  –  in similar tasks (128, 129) is usually seen to 
support “hypotheses about the induction of a sense of beat or 
pulse in the listener” [Iyer (130), p. 392]. To this, we add that 
these findings also reflect more generally the ecological situated-
ness of the whole organism: listening to music involves an active, 
skillful, sensorimotor, exercise, which is intrinsically determined 
by the sensorimotor expertise (in terms of motor vocabulary of 
musical actions, for example) of the musical animal  –  i.e., its 
personal capacity to co-constitute (and act in) its niche, through 
the establishment of a repertoire of meaningful relationships by 
which it maintains its autonomous identity or a ‘point of view’ 
(131–134). This resonates closely with a main principle of the 
‘enactive approach,’ namely, the idea that perception and action 
are radically entwined extraneurally in non-linear terms – and 
that this forms the basis for our being-in-the world (59). Put sim-
ply, from this perspective, it is not only the brain that is exposed 
to musical feedback. Rather, the entire living system – with his or 
her listening biography, body, affectivity, and history of structural 
couplings with the (sonic and cultural) environment – participates 
as a whole in musical experience (46, 93, 127, 135–138). We will 
further develop these insights when discussing of PD treatments.
intersubjective interaction
The third dimension of embodiment  –  intersubjective interac-
tion – aims to look beyond traditional ‘mentalistic’ approaches 
of social cognition, which often conceive of social understand-
ing in terms of simulation-like mechanisms7 or through the 
6 As it is well known, these “mirror neurons” do not code the precise movement 
performed by another individual but, rather, the goal of the given action. As long 
as the goal of a given action is different, these neurons are selective enough to 
distinguish between different kinematic schemas (74).
7 The theory holds that understanding the behaviours and the beliefs of others is a 
matter of simulating them internally with my own cognitive system – “as if ” I was 
behaving that way or possessing that belief.
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construction of theoretical, spectatorial, models8 (139–142). 
Embodied – enactive in particular – approaches to interactivity, 
instead, define the processes of mutual interactions and coordina-
tion as self-regulative and sensorimotor networks (143–146). These 
networks are based on recursive patterns of action and perception 
mutually shaping each other dynamically (147). Consider two (or 
more) individuals playing together: no matter how much they 
rehearsed jointly or how many times they played the same piece, 
there will always be a sense in which each performance is different 
from one another, as even one brief ‘crescendo’ by a musician (or 
a particular environmental setting, or audience, etc.) will affect 
the other and the overall performance in real time [(138, 148, 
149), p. 40]. As cognition is a process that occurs in a domain 
of interactions, it is realized through the biological morphology 
of the body and its dynamical and sensorimotor interplay with 
the others, where these aspects represent different typologies of 
embodiment and not separated domains (150). The body is not 
a rigid and fixed object, but rather a flexible entity that acts in 
(it modifies and responds to) the world (151); it is an “imprint 
of social engagement” (ibid.). The living and lived body is what 
allows the meaningful interactions with its environment; it is, as 
we stated above, the pre-condition for being-in-the-world (67, 
152). The brain, accordingly, can be seen as ‘participating’ in the 
action rather than ‘controlling’ it9 (122). If cognition is realized in 
the domain of the system’s meaningful and embodied interactiv-
ity, it is not ‘located’ in any traditional sense; rather it bypasses the 
notions of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ (95, 114).
The notion of embodiment, therefore, encompasses all the 
processes connected to living subjectivity, shaping, and being 
shaped by the environment in which an agent is embedded. This 
does not only entail ‘basic’ processes – such as perception or inter-
action: there is growing agreement across a variety of domains 
in highlighting the body’s crucial role for high-level skills – such 
as problem solving and reasoning (153). Along these lines, it 
has been demonstrated that visual and rhythmic perception are 
shaped by looking and by body movements in both infants and 
adults (154–157), that motor experience facilitates memory for 
musical excerpts (158), and that walking is crucial for an infant 
cognitive development (72). Put simply, if we reduce mental life 
to the activity of the brain and the central nervous system, we may 
lose an important chance to understand the organism as ecologi-
cally situated – where bodies are not reduced to representations 
in the somatosensory cortex but are instead seen as constitutive 
category of the system’s being-in-the world. Embodied theories 
entail both “micro phenomena within the body, for example, the 
physiology of sight, the biochemistry of muscle cell contraction, 
[and] macro phenomena, for example, the evolution of ecosys-
tems” [Krieger (159), p. 351]. While the relevance of these insights 
8 Accordingly, people manage to make sense of the others by developing a 
“common-sense” theory of mind consisting of sets of laws connecting inner states 
to external stimuli, other inner states, or behaviours. 
9 As Di Paolo and colleagues insist: “Embodiment means that mind is inherent in 
the active, worldful body, that the body is not a puppet controlled by the brain 
but a whole animate system with many autonomous layers of self-coordination 
and self-organization and various degrees of openness to the world that create its 
sense-making activity” [Di Paolo et al. (102), p. 42].
is recognized by different authors in the context of cognitive 
science and philosophy of mind, it remains partially unexplored 
within other domains. In the Section “A Network of Non-linear 
Interactions,” thus, we will consider the challenge posited by the 
embodied approaches more in detail, discussing how they may 
help us reconsider the ways in which we look at brain science.
a netWorK oF non-Linear 
interaCtions
In the last few decades, a growing number of researchers 
became interested not only in analyzing the cognitive opera-
tions in play while performing a musically relevant task, but 
also in understanding how are these operations associated with 
particular (networks of) brain regions10 (161, 162). Although 
most neuroscientific research has moved from functional 
segregation to functional integration [see Friston (163, 164)], 
and a number of brain scientists expressed doubts toward both 
neural localization and models based on a mind-brain identity 
as legitimate explanatory tools [see Bennett and Hacker (165) 
and Fuchs (166)], the tendency to look for ‘neural correlates 
of music processing’ nevertheless remains within musical 
research. As Peretz and Coltheart admit, “musical abilities 
are […] studied as part of a distinct mental module with its 
own procedures and knowledge bases that are associated 
with dedicated and separate neural substrates” (2003, p. 688) 
(167). This view of music as functionally autonomous seems to 
contrast with a vast range of findings in the literature, which 
highlight the multimodal and plastic nature of brain process-
ing mechanisms and the widely distributed neural networks 
in both hemispheres this involves (168, 169). “Brain anatomy 
reveals that brain regions are interconnected in a rich and dense 
pattern, both locally and in terms of long-range connections” 
[Pessoa (170), p. 198]. To put it in a different way, anatomical 
segregations of musical functions seem to disregard the role 
of overlapping cortical regions and interindividual differences 
in brain substrates (171), as well as the observed evidence of 
ontogenetically developed  –  and rapidly adaptive  –  cerebral 
networks (24, 72). Neurons themselves display dynamical 
properties: there is no simple mapping from neural activity to 
behavior as what the neurons code depend on various time and 
contexts (172). Cross-sectional approaches to the study of the 
brain, thus, may downplay the developmental and ecological 
aspects shaping the living being-environment relationship 
(87). The brain is dynamical, self-organizing,11 and massively 
distributed (104, 174): it mediates and enables the non-linear12 
and reciprocal interactions between the body and the world. 
10 From the focus on the theoretical level between physical implementation and 
behavioural output (as in classical cognitivism), the exploration of the brain’s 
functional neuroanatomy led a number of scholars to maintain that different brain 
regions represent different musical functions, such that neural tissue at a specific 
location govern given cognitive features [e.g., Tan et al. (160)].
11 “Systems are self-organized when there is a reciprocal relationship among local 
areas and behavior at the global state of the system” (173).
12 These interactions are “non-linear” because in a system of reciprocal continuity 
there is no clear “input” or “output” (59, 104).
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Information, by this view, is not passively retrieved from the 
‘outer word’ but rather enacted through the meaningful and 
sensorimotor activity of the organism13 (50).
Thus, because both genetic and ecological factors influence 
the development of neuronal networks (177–180) a number of 
scholars have found it necessary to look beyond brain reduction-
ism (59, 88, 171, 181) and integrate traditional neuroscientific 
research with the study of a wider organism-world nexus (50, 
57, 182). For example, recent work by Kiverstein and Miller (58), 
and Pessoa (170), shows how ‘structure–function’ mappings are 
best understood in terms of dynamical sub-components of a 
larger network, where a given function is highly context depend-
ent and may vary over time in its dynamical interplay with the 
environment, which offers the animal various possibilities for 
actions according to its degree of complexity (183). It is worth 
noticing that the insistence on large-scale dynamic networks 
resonates closely with the view that sees cognition as belonging 
to a ‘relational domain’ (184), in which the living system acts 
in ways that are relevant to sustaining itself under precarious 
conditions. To understand the global behavior of a living organ-
ism, then, we need to do more than simply analyze one of its 
sub-components (i.e., the pathways underlying autonomic and 
muscular responses to music), as none of the system’s part con-
trols and defines the system by itself (185). The relation between 
biological organization and cognitive functions is thus best 
understood as ‘circular,’ rather than ‘linearly causal’ (71). This is 
to say that an embodied view on human musicality – and human 
cognition more generally  –  replaces the classic input/output 
framework with a non-linear perturbation/response distinction, 
in which the brain does play a very important part, but is not the 
sole factor involved.
By understanding cognitive processes as widely distributed 
across the entire body of the animal, and into its niche, the 
embodied approach goes beyond brain reductionism and 
provides a welcome alternative to classic computational frame-
works (50). In what remains, we apply these insights to clinical 
research, arguing that an embodied perspective may help us 
address some of the challenges that emerge within this context 
in new ways. Focusing on music-based rehabilitative paradigms 
for PD patients, we explore the possibility that music may not 
just act ‘externally’  –  somehow causing relevant behavioral 
responses – but rather that involves the agents’ whole embodied 
being-in-the-world in active engagement; that it becomes a part 
of the network of non-linear interactions that characterizes the 
brain-body-world nexus (182). In doing so we hope to offer new 
insights into some aspects of PD treatment, and thus stimulate 
discussion on the interpretation and development of new 
approaches to rehabilitation.
13 Consider, for example, the nervous system: its inner states are always stimulated 
by the environment, but not influenced causally through an input-output rela-
tion; “the nervous system does not receive information. It rather creates a world 
by defining which configurations of the milieu are stimuli” [Weber (106), p. 15]. 
Functional localisation, reductionism, and ‘internalist’ frameworks are unable to 
capture these aspects by definition, as self-organisation occurs at a larger ecological 
scale (175, 176).
parKinsonisM and tHe  
eMBodied Mind
Parkinson’s disease is a degenerative disorder associated with 
the progressive loss of the nigrostriatal dopaminergic neurons in 
the Basal Ganglia, which triggers functional changes in the same 
cortical network (186, 187). Non-motor symptoms are frequently 
the first signs and affect sense of smell and sleep regulation. 
Histologically, a classic mark of PD is represented by the pres-
ence of fibrillar aggregates of proteins called ‘lewy bodies,’ which 
displace other internal components of the remaining neurons 
in the midbrain, but also in the brain stem, the olfactory bulb 
and – at later stages – the cerebral cortex (188). The severe loss of 
dopaminergic cell activity in the midbrain results in hypokinetic 
disorders such as akinesia (the inability in initiating a movement), 
bradykinesia (slowness of movements) or freezing (impossibility 
to move in any direction) [see Berardelli et al. (189) and Grabli 
et al. (190)]. Usually, one of the first symptoms associated with PD 
is represented by an involuntary 4–5 Hz resting movement (191); 
clinical observations suggest that this tremor may disappear in 
voluntary actions, but can worsen with ambulation and with 
‘Froment’s maneuver’ (contralateral motor activity) (192). As the 
condition progresses, tremor is often accompanied with muscle 
rigidity, which leads to resistance of externally imposed joint 
movements (193). While states of relaxation may help, patients 
who are asked to move the contralateral limb often exhibit – like 
with tremor – an aggravation of the symptom (194, 195). Other 
typical motor deficits (often, but not always, emerging in later-
stage PD) are postural instability and gait disorders, which result 
in an increased risk of falls (a predictor of mortality) and in turn 
critically challenge independent living habits and quality of life 
more generally (196, 197). Symptomatically, treatments with 
dopaminergic agonists or deep-brain stimulation have been 
demonstrated to be partially effective with many of these motor 
disorders (198–200), and are thus often integrated with non-
invasive techniques based on music and rhythmic engagement 
(201, 202).
extending the Loop
A growing wealth of evidence shows how the contribution of 
music-based interventions is important for improving symptoms 
such as Parkinsonian gait (203–205). By matching their walking 
to the musical beat, or to a metronome, PD patients normally 
exhibit considerable benefit in terms of velocity, cadence, and 
stride length (206, 207). Interestingly, auditory cues for this 
kind of treatment display advantages when compared to visual, 
somatosensory, or combined cues: not only is reaction time to 
auditory cues shorter when compared to visual and tactile ones, 
but ‘periodicity’ is also best captured in sonic contexts rather than 
through other sensory systems14 (210, 211). Indeed ‘timing’ and 
‘periodicity’ are fundamental aspects for gait, ensuring adequate 
14 To clarify this point, consider the apparent universality and spontaneity of 
sensorimotor synchronisation and impulse to move with music: evolutionary, this 
phenomenon may have promoted coordination and emotional communication 
(208, 209), contributing in strengthening the link between musical behaviours and 
wellbeing in intersubjective contexts.
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consistency in pace and stability. As basal ganglia-cortical 
circuitry is typically involved in time-related processes – with a 
series of structures depending on dopaminergic innervation – its 
malfunctioning in PD has a significant impact on timing and 
motor synchronization (152, 212–214).
This is not to say, however, that ‘timing’ can be understood as 
a high-level cognitive ability that is functionally autonomous and 
encapsulated in the brain. First, besides the basal ganglia, it is 
likely that other cortical regions contribute in timing processing, 
thus constituting a distributed network that includes the cerebel-
lum, SMA, pre-SMA, inferior parietal cortex, and premotor cor-
tex (215–217). Moreover, the basal ganglia itself is involved in the 
selection and inhibition of motor processes (218), highlighting 
the deep connectivity of categories such as action, body, and ‘tim-
ing.’ Second, such connectivity implies that we cannot understand 
what ‘timing’ and ‘periodicity’ entail if we do not look beyond 
the boundaries of skull and skin to consider how the whole 
embodied agent participates in gait. Walking and synchronizing 
with a beat do not happen ‘in the head’; they occur in the concrete 
sensorimotor dynamics of the world in which we are embedded, a 
world that is meaningful and rich of affordative structures ready 
to be acted upon. Music offers such affordances (219) according 
to the history of structural couplings between music users and 
sonic environment(s) (91, 92, 94, 133, 137, 138, 220, 221). We 
shall return to this point in the Section “Beyond Motor Recovery.” 
What we want to stress, here, is that the organism’s body,15 in its 
‘motor resonance’ with the beat, enables the fluidity of the gait’s 
‘kinetic melodies’ in a continuous dynamical process of action 
and perception. This means that ‘timing processes’ – as subcom-
ponents of the distributed network enabling gait  –  involve the 
entire body, and the world, literally extending beyond skull and 
skin. Thus musical rhythm offers a new pathway to enact self-
organization through sensorimotor coupling by compensating 
for the malfunctioning of one of the system’s sub-networks. The 
hyperactivity recorded in the cerebellum and in the pre-SMA at 
the preclinical stage (223–225) seems to confirm these network’s 
self-organizing properties, which tend to develop other processes 
to counterbalance the impaired sensorimotor circle dynamically. 
As pre-SMA will eventually become hypoactive, left and right 
cerebellum and contralateral motor cortex have been observed 
as hyperactive also at later stages (226). Moreover, the compen-
satory mechanisms emerging in PD’s pre-clinical and clinical 
stages show that self-organization also occurs on an ecological 
scale, integrating resources internal and external to the patient. 
Therefore, positing a single brain-body-world nexus  –  instead 
of the classic model based on the separation between internal 
(brain-bound) and external (worldly) domains  –  may help us 
better capture and model the ways in which the reorganization 
of the nexus’ sub-networks unfolds in terms of dynamical and 
continuous interplay with the environment (175, 227, 228).
This process of wordly self-regulation, in which patients aim to 
recalibrate their sensorimotor engagement with the world, should 
15 It is important to note that here we refer to “body” not as an objective piece of the 
world – the German “Körper” – but also as “Leib,” a living and lived body with its 
autonomous and dynamical layers of self-organizational adaptivity [see Gallagher 
and Zahavi (222) and Merleau-Ponty (67)].
also comprehend the ‘social dimension’ of embodiment, as the 
world involves other agents by definition. Stressing the importance 
of social interactions in a patient’s being-in-the-world, it would 
be thus interesting to see how PD patient would respond to the 
so-called ‘perceptual crossing paradigm,’ which has been recently 
developed to study real-time situations in non-individualistic terms 
(229). Its simple methodology, which involves only “two subjects, 
a one-dimensional space, and a yes/no answer” (230), makes it 
particularly suitable for clinical contexts, and may illuminate on 
how PD affects the patient’s capacity to interact with others. In the 
original experiment, as reported by Auvray et al. (229), pairs of 
blindfolded subjects in different rooms are asked to interact with 
each others in a computer-generated space. Participants are asked 
to move a cursor in this virtual space, clicking a mouse button 
when they perceive the presence of another participant. But since 
subjects are blindfolded, they only receive a tactile stimulation 
on the free hand when their avatar crosses an object in the one-
dimensional space. There are three different types of objects to be 
encountered: (i) the moving avatar of another participant, (ii) an 
object placed in a fixed location by the experimenters, and (iii) the 
moving ‘shadow image’ of the partner’s avatar, that is an object that 
reproduces at a displaced distance the same movements of (i). The 
only difference between (i) and (iii), thus, is that with (i) a dyadic 
interaction is possible. As Froese and Di Paolo comment:
The two mobile objects exhibit exactly the same move-
ment, but only an overlap of the receptor fields of both 
participants gives rise to mutual sensory stimulation. 
Note that the difference between these three types of 
objects cannot be directly provided by the sensors, 
which in all cases can only produce a binary, all-or-
nothing response depending on whether something is 
overlapping their particular receptor field or not. Thus, 
if the participants are to be successful at distinguishing 
which of the objects is the other agent’s receptor field, 
they must accordingly rely on differences in the kinds 
of interactions that these objects afford. The results of 
the psychological study show that, at least under the 
minimalist conditions of this experiment, the success-
ful recognition of an ongoing interaction with another 
person is not only based on individual capacities. It is 
also based on certain properties that are intrinsic to 
the joint perceptual activity itself [Froese and Di Paolo 
(231), p. 49].
Indeed, participants displayed greater accuracy in clicking 
the button when meeting the partner’s avatar (65.9% of the 
clicks ±  SD of 13.9) when compared to meeting the shadow 
image (23.0 ±  10.4%) or the static object (11.0 ±  8.9%) [see 
again Auvray and Rohde (230)]. In the case of PD patients, we 
predict a significant decrease in correct answers, as their ability 
to interact with the world might be partially compromised by the 
condition. The results, however, might be improved by exposure 
to motorically familiar musical cues. Indeed, hypothesizing that 
a malfunctioning sensorimotor coupling with the world makes 
the body an ‘obstacle’ for the living system’s being-in-the-world 
(232), listening to music one can play may help to re-establish 
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the correct sensorimotor loop with the environment through 
a ‘motor resonance’ enabled by the mirror mechanism. In the 
Section “Beyond Motor Recovery,” we will try to describe how 
such hypothesis could be tested adequately, generating predic-
tions that involve the whole living system in its dynamic interplay 
with the environment – and not only movements’ rehabilitation.
Beyond Motor recovery
It is likely that the ‘motor resonance’ in play during music based 
motor rehabilitation involves the mirror mechanism mentioned 
above, as it does not seem to be significantly altered by PD (233). 
The activation of sensorimotor networks during music listening 
is well known (234, 235) – with musicians and subjects who have 
a practical knowledge of the complex order actions required to 
obtain a particular music showing stronger activations in the 
front-parietal-temporal network (132, 236). While the interpreta-
tion of such work is still a subject of controversy (237–239), it 
may nevertheless be argued that a ‘motor vocabulary’ of musical 
actions is formed when learning music. However, the firing of the 
neurons that might constitute such a ‘vocabulary’ (or ‘repertoire’) 
during listening tasks need not be understood in terms of ‘infor-
mation processing.’ Rather it may be seen as allowing the system 
to prepare for action, possibly underpinning “a non-articulated 
immediate perception of the other person’s intentional actions” 
[Gallagher (240), p. 541; see also Gallagher (147)]. As preparation 
for action is indeed an important component of intersubjective 
contexts  –  both phylogenetically and ontogenetically  –  mirror 
neuron theories may help us understand some other aspects of 
PD rehabilitative strategies. For example, they can explain why 
simple rhythmic excerpts or metronomic beats are widely and 
successfully adopted in this type of clinical research: almost eve-
ryone possesses (i.e., acquires through development) the motor 
expertise necessary to produce a repetitive beat. In this sense, the 
relationship between music and living systems is literally shaped 
by the history of structural sensorimotor coupling between them. 
Thus, the (therapeutic) compensatory mechanisms resulting 
from musical exposure appear to work when listeners-patients 
possess the adequate (meaningful) motor expertise relevant to 
re-enact the goal-directed actions afforded by the auditory cues.
A way to test this hypothesis in PD-related contexts might 
involve familiarizing16 subjects at an early clinical stage with 
musical stimuli that are more complicated than a simple beat-
pulse, and then observing at a later stage of the rehabilitation 
whether the same stimuli are more beneficial for gait (and – as 
it will emerge later – for more general improvement) when com-
pared to standard simple beat or to unfamiliar music. This is to 
say that patients are not passive ‘responders’; rather they actively 
‘enact’ their own meaningful vocabulary of musical actions dur-
ing music-based interventions, bringing forth their ‘autonomous 
identity.’ Increased familiarity with music-making in both 
individual and collective settings could foster the development of 
intersubjective rehabilitative contexts, where the interactivity of 
patients may generate more efficient results – increasing demands 
16 That is, developing the sensorimotor skills required to perform the musical 
stimuli.
in sensorimotor integration. Indeed, this approach might be 
taken further to involve patients in music improvisation and the 
co-creation of musically relevant stimuli. Put simply, we suggest 
that by encouraging patients to develop more complex rhythmic-
musical understandings, which they then develop and apply in the 
course of their treatment, new clinical possibilities may emerge 
that involve patients more comprehensively across the range 
of their being. In this way, treatment that involves increasingly 
adaptive and creative interactions with the environment (musical 
stimuli and other patients), may foster ways of being-in-the-world 
that lead to improved self-regulation, as well as a renewed, and 
much needed, sense of agency. Along these lines, the use of more 
sophisticated musical cues, and more intersubjective settings, 
might also lead to beneficial results beyond the motor domain. 
This is important, if we consider that a cascade of other non-
somatic symptoms17 often accompanies the motor dysfunctions 
described in the Section “Extending the loop”: half of PD patients, 
for example, are reported to develop depression (241). But how 
could embodied theories say something about depression? And 
how could music-based motor rehabilitation help?
Relevant applications in clinical settings stemming from 
embodied theories have been recently explored within neu-
ropsychiatric and psychopathological research  –  for example 
in schizophrenia (242) and depression (232). Research on the 
latter, in particular, suggests that depressive patients display 
similar symptoms to those of PD patients, including slow gait and 
reduced stride length (243–245). Indeed, like the PD sufferer, the 
depressive subject experiences a loss in their dynamical relation 
with the world and “cannot retain a position outside of her body” 
[Fuchs (53), pp. 99–100]. This is important when considering 
that, as Kyselo and Di Paolo (246) report, without the bodily 
power of action (for example in case of global paralysis) a subject 
may also suffer a decrease of cognitive activities such as imagery 
and goal-directed thinking [see Kübler and Birbaumer (247)]. 
Consider the following passage, where Fuchs and Schlimme (232) 
describe depressive melancholia as a case of ‘hyperembodiment.’ 
The authors argue that the process of becoming separated from 
the living system’s peripersonal space results from psychomotor 
inhibition (as in PD) and a loss of the conative dimension of the 
body – its “affective and appetitive directedness”:
Normally, it is this [conative] dimension that opens up 
the peripersonal space as a realm of possibilities, “affor-
dances” and goals for action. In depressive patients, 
however, drive and impulse, appetite and libido are 
reduced or lost, no more disclosing potential sources 
of pleasure and satisfaction. Confined to the present 
state of bodily restriction, depressive patients cannot 
transcend their body any more. The open horizon of 
possible experiences shrinks into a locked atmosphere, 
in which everything becomes permeated by a sense of 
lost possibilities. With growing inhibition, sensory–
motor space is restricted to the nearest environment, 
17 Other symptoms may include hallucinations, disorders of sleep and behaviour, 
dementia, psychosis, decrease of attention and memory, and language impairment.
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culminating in depressive stupor. Thus, melancholia 
may be described as a reification or “corporealization” 
of the lived body, or as a “hyperembodiment” [Fuchs 
and Schlimme (232), pp. 572–573].
By this view, therapeutic interventions can be seen as an 
attempt to re-establish the functioning of the agent-environment 
system as a whole. Integrating standard rehabilitative settings 
for motor recovery in PD patients with more complex stimuli 
and activities, in early and later clinical stages, may lead to more 
beneficial results in terms of reshaping the motor resonance 
with the environment. These results are not limited to the motor 
domain, but may cover also non-somatic aspects of the pathol-
ogy, as in the case of depression. Art-based therapies in general, 
and music therapies in particular, have been widely employed 
in the treatment of unipolar depression (248, 249), leading to 
encouraging results. An example comes from dance therapies, 
which have been proven effective in improving physical fitness 
and well-being more generally (250–252).
Acting upon the conative dimension of the sensorimo-
tor coupling with the world, we argue that developing more 
meaningful musical environments could help in stabilizing the 
patients’ embodied being-in-the-world (in a better fashion than 
with unfamiliar music or rhythmical beats only) by engaging the 
interactivity of the entire living system. The mechanisms underly-
ing this are to be found in the neural compensatory mechanisms 
elicited by musical participation, and by the active engagement 
of the body in the concrete dynamics of action (253). Without 
positing a clear input–output relation between music and patient, 
an embodied approach to PD treatment with music emphasizes 
the self-regulatory aspects of brains and bodies, conceived as 
unities inseparable from their niche. Also, it conceives PD as a 
disturbance of the subjective sensorimotor skills to engage with 
the world, rather than solely a neurological pathology. Music, 
here, does not only influence the excitability of given neurons, 
but offers a new affordative space to the recovering embodied 
agent, compensating for the malfunctioning action-perception 
loop that characterizes the disease. It is important to stress once 
again that this does not exclude affectivity but, on the contrary, 
highlights the conative dimension of the living body as integrative 
part of its perceiving, knowing, doing, and being – opening new 
and fascinating possibilities for health and well-being.
ConCLUsion
In avoiding the twofold reductionism of anatomical specificity 
and information-processing generality, the embodied trend 
provides a considerable challenge to established theoretical 
frameworks concerning the nature of mind, behavior, and agency. 
‘Embodiment,’ although declined differently through the ‘4Es’ 
described above, embraces the centrality of self-regulation, 
sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective interactions for 
understanding the complex nature of our being-in-the-world (98, 
100). We are confident this general reorientation can stimulate 
the development of new conceptual tools and research methods 
that may enhance standard rehabilitative settings within clinical 
contexts. In this paper we focused on how this may occur in PD 
research, hypothesizing that music based therapeutic settings 
could become even more efficient if coherently informed by 
theoretical models inspired by an embodied account to cognition.
Empirically, the adoption of embodied insights emphasizes 
the need to develop new experimental methods that are able to 
capture the way in which possible perturbations (i.e., a malfunc-
tion of a given sub-network) destabilize the whole brain-body-
world system. Strategies for intervention, by this light, should not 
focus only on the isolated symptom thought to provoke a desired 
behavioral output (104). Rather, an embodied approach to motor 
rehabilitation should also consider, for example, conative, agen-
tic, creative, and intersubjective dimensions as fundamental for 
the treatment of the patient – perhaps manipulating the degree 
of mutual interaction and affective experience according to the 
motor knowledge of the patient. Indeed, a musical stimulus 
(beyond a mere beat) is not only a ‘timekeeper,’ but also an actual 
tool for cognition, a meaningful event that affords a variety of self-
regulative, interactive, and sensorimotor processes depending of 
the agent-music interaction’s degree of complexity. With this in 
mind, and drawing on insights from research on mirror neurons, 
we hypothesized that PD patients might benefit from familiariza-
tion phases with more complex stimuli beginning in the early 
stages of the disease. The compensatory mechanisms in play 
during exposure to musical rhythms might then be more widely 
effective in the recovery of other (i.e., depressive) symptoms. This 
is just one example of how embodied approaches may define a 
broader approach to the study of PD rehabilitation, and why it 
necessitates further discussion and testing.
Overall, what we want to emphasize is that, theoretically, 
this kind of non-reductionist approach may be fundamental in 
rethinking many taken-for-granted assumptions concerning 
health and well-being, neuroscience, and music research. While 
the operational domain of the system’s internal (e.g., brain) states 
is certainly fundamental to the interactive processes of such 
interactions, these internal processes alone cannot be identified 
the mind is 
Embodied
the mind is 
Embedded
the mind is 
Enacted
the mind is 
Extended
FiGUre 1 | the embodied approach in its ‘4-es’ declinations. As well 
known, however, not all versions of embodiment are extended, or enacted. 
Also, some of the arguments used by proponents of the extended mind 
thesis stand in open contrast with a truly enactive characterisation of 
cognition, and might eventually collapse into a functionalist account (or 
extended functionalism). In this paper, then, we just employ the basic points 
provided above and do not engage in relevant discussion.
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with ‘cognition’: to do so “is to confuse levels of discourse or to 
make a category mistake (neurons do not think and feel; people 
and animals do)” [Thompson and Stapleton (95), p. 27]. In other 
words, the processes allowing the system to maintain itself as 
autonomous are realized in the sensorimotor, dynamic, affective, 
interplay between bodies (including brains) and environments. 
These processes, as a whole, are not strictly speaking “neural,” but 
rather define a non-linear network constituted by both neural and 
extra-neural interactive sub-networks (50).
Consider, for example, research in music psychology: while 
it is diverse and interdisciplinary, incorporating both ‘subjective’ 
(i.e., introspective, qualitative) and ‘objective’ (i.e., quantitative) 
methodologies (254), a common tacit assumption in the field is 
that (musical) experience is inner, computationally implemented, 
and reducible to neural activation. Embodied approaches chal-
lenge this perspective, showing that human musicality is deeply 
embodied (being constantly implemented by sensorimotor 
feedbacks and real-time bodily activities), embedded (as it is 
always situated in specific sociocultural niche), enacted (relying 
on the history of structural couplings between musical agents 
and musical environment) and extended (as no clear boundaries 
between internal and external resources exist in driving cogni-
tive processes). And likewise, embodied perspectives represent 
a call for a new kind of integrative and non-reductionist music 
therapy – one that explores the possibilities of human musicality 
from diverse perspectives; and that may transform motor reha-
bilitation into a participatory activity where motion, emotion, 
listening biographies, and neural networks are all involved in a 
complex recursive interplay (255).
Data on brain and behavioral activities has contributed 
greatly to new perspectives on the audio-visuo-motor integration 
underlying musical experience. We wish to stimulate research-
ers to integrate this body of knowledge with a critical analysis 
of the theoretical models underlying rehabilitative contexts (i.e., 
information-processing). Thus, by moving beyond traditional 
input-output and stimulus-response paradigms, our approach 
identifies large-scale networks (inside and outside the skull) as 
a solid alternative to reductionist approaches – highlighting the 
explanatory role of embodied perspectives in describing how an 
autonomous system develops, stabilizes, and transforms accord-
ing to the reciprocal influences of local and global factors. In this 
way, hypokinesia, tremor, rigidity – but also depression, and other 
non-somatic symptoms – may be understood in a new light: as 
affecting the patient’s being-in-the-world in a way that requires 
an recalibration of the whole brain-body-world network. In this 
way, the development of richer, embodied approaches to music 
intervention for PD (and other disorders) not only offers pos-
sibilities for improving the general quality of life of patients, it 
may also help us better understand how therapeutic recalibration 
occurs providing additional insights for clinical, musical, and 
neuroscientific, research.
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